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Human vision brieﬂy retains a trace of a stimulus after it disappears. This trace—iconic
memory—is often believed to be a surrogate for the original stimulus, a representational
structure that can be used as if the original stimulus were still present. To investigate
its nature, a ﬂicker-search paradigm was developed that relied upon a full scan (rather
than partial report) of its contents. Results show that for visual search it can indeed act
as a surrogate, with little cost for alternating between visible and iconic representations.
However, the duration over which it can be used depends on the type of task: some tasks
can use iconic memory for at least 240 ms, others for only about 190 ms, while others for
no more than about 120 ms. The existence of these different limits suggests that iconic
memory may have multiple layers, each corresponding to a particular level of the visual
hierarchy. In this view, the inability to use a layer of iconic memory may reﬂect an inability
to maintain feedback connections to the corresponding representation.
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INTRODUCTION
It has long been known that human vision retains a brief trace
of any stimulus it encounters (see e.g., Loftus and Irwin, 1998).
This trace, often referred to as iconic memory, has been a focus of
investigation for several decades (e.g., Sperling, 1960; Coltheart,
1980; Ruff et al., 2007; Sligte et al., 2010). It is sometimes consid-
ered to be a “visual echo” that can act as a surrogate, i.e., that as
long as it lasts, its contents can be used in much the same way
as if the stimulus were still visible. But there is little consensus
as to what—if any—function iconic memory may have (see e.g.,
Pashler, 1998). On one hand, it has sometimes been considered
a simple side effect, with potentially deleterious effects on per-
ception (Haber, 1983). On the other, it could potentially increase
the amount of information that could be extracted from a brief
presentation (Haber, 1971).
Iconic memory has most often been studied via partial report,
in which observers are brieﬂy shown an array of a dozen or so
items and then asked to report a subset that is cued after the array
disappears (Sperling, 1960; Averbach and Coriell, 1961). Various
studies have also examined the extent to which iconic represen-
tations can be used in memorization and recognition tasks (e.g.,
Loftus et al., 1992; Keysers et al., 2005) as well as change detection
(e.g., Becker et al., 2000; Sligte et al., 2010). All assume that iconic
memory is equally available to any visual process. But is this really
so? Or might it be used to different extents by different processes?
To investigate this, a ﬂicker search paradigm was developed
(Figure 1). This is a variant of visual search, where the observer
must determine as quickly as possible the presence or absence
of a given target among a set of non-target items (or distrac-
tors) in a display; different visual operations can be tested by
different choices of target and distractors (e.g., Treisman and
Gormican, 1988; Wolfe and Horowitz, 2004). In ﬂicker search,
observers search displays that are visible only intermittently: after
a ﬁxed time (the display duration, or on-time), the display is
blanked for some ﬁxed interval [the interstimulus interval (ISI),
or off-time], this cycle then repeated until the observer responds
or times out. (To enable maximal use of iconic memory, no
masks are present.) For many kinds of search task, the time
needed to respond is proportional to the set size (the number
of items in the display), likely reﬂecting the application of an
attentional mechanism (Treisman and Gormican, 1988;Wolfe and
Horowitz, 2004). If this mechanism is sufﬁciently slow, search
will require the scan of the blank intervals1. The question then
is whether the speed of search through a blank interval (i.e.,
iconic memory) is the same as through the representation that
gave rise to it. This can be answered by comparing performance
when iconic memory is used for different fractions of the display
cycle.
Such a“full scan”technique removes several potential problems
of partial report, such as complications due to memory consolida-
tion and transfer; it also reduces the likelihood of observers using
different strategies (cf. Estes and Taylor, 1964). Consequently, it
may provide a more precise estimate of iconic properties. Impor-
tantly for the issue at hand, it also allows a wide variety of tasks to
be examined using the same general framework.
1If the start of search after display onset is stochastic, and the variance of this is sufﬁ-
cient, random sampling will ensure that the fraction of on- or off-time encountered
will on average be that in the display cycle. To help with this, observers were dropped
from the analysis if search was over before the ﬁrst display cycle was complete—i.e.,
before a full testing of the ﬁrst iconic representation could be made. The criterion
used was that search should be slow enough to allow the complete testing of 10
items (the maximum present) duration a single display cycle at the slowest cadence
(320 ms). Note that this does not assume an item-by-item scan of the display; atten-
tion could be allocated to the items in parallel. On the basis of this criterion, two
observers were removed: one from Experiment 1A, and one from Experiment 3C.
More severe criteria did not signiﬁcantly change the overall pattern of results.
For even the fastest search encountered here (c. 50 ms/item in Experiment 1A), a
scan of both visual and iconic representations was essentially complete for displays
containing only six items. Importantly, cadence affected only the slopes and not the
shapes of the response-time curves (Figures 1 and 4). This provides evidence that
the timing assumptions underlying this technique are reasonably accurate for the
conditions examined here.
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FIGURE 1 | Experiment 1A: detection of orientation. (A) General setup.
Target is a vertical line; distractors are lines tilted ± 30◦. Displays “ﬂickered”
until subject responded, or 5 s elapsed. (B) Response times and error rates
as a function of set size for the three cadences. (C) Data recast as slopes.
Slope for base cadence (23.0 ms/item) is unaffected by either an increase in
off-time (22.1 ms/item) or an increase in on-time (24.4 ms/item). Note that
since these are target-present slopes from a presumably self-terminating
search, the search speed itself is obtained by multiplying by a factor of about
2. The resultant speeds are about 50 ms/item, similar to those found
elsewhere. (D) Data recast as baselines. Values for the base cadence
(564 ms) are not signiﬁcantly affected by an increase in off-time (576 ms) or
on-time (580 ms). Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
In what follows, it will be shown that this approach can indeed
work, and provides converging evidence that iconic memory can
act as a surrogate for a stimulus that has suddenly disappeared. But
it will also be shown that iconic memory is available to different
tasks for different amounts of time, with these limits clustering
into a few groups, each likely corresponding to a particular level of
the visual hierarchy. As such, it will be argued that this approach
can shed considerable light on the nature of the various levels of
the visual hierarchy, and on the nature of the feedforward and
feedback2 connections between them.
GENERAL METHOD
Unless otherwise speciﬁed, each experimental condition used
three timing patterns, or cadences: a base cadence of 80/120 (80 ms
on; 120 ms off), and two longer cadences of 80/240 and 200/120,
created by increasing the off- and on-times respectively by 120 ms.
Each condition tested 12 observers, with order of cadence counter-
balanced. Observers were seated 57 cm from the monitor. Displays
subtended 11.5◦ × 8.5◦ in visual angle, and contained 2, 6, or 10
items, with spacing controlled to keep item density constant. For
2The term “re-entry” generally denotes a particular type of feedback, viz., that in
which density of back connections is similar to or exceeds the density of forward
connections, and for which the mapping of back connections is not haphazard, but
has a mapping similar to that of the feedforward connections. In the context here,
“re-entry” and “feedback” will be considered synonymous.
detection conditions, the targetwas present on a randomly selected
half of trials; otherwise, the target was always present in each dis-
play. Items were ∼1◦ in extent, the exact size depending on the
condition tested.
Lighting level was sufﬁcient to allow color to be easily seen (i.e.,
above the mesopic range). A cathode-ray tube (CRT) display was
used for all conditions. Blank ﬁelds and display backgrounds were
both medium gray, resulting in a continual ﬂickering of the items
on a static background. All items were black, apart from those
in the contrast polarity condition. The appearance of a gray ﬁeld
after the disappearance of an item therefore corresponded to an
increase rather than a decrease of phosphor activation, ensuring
that phosphor persistence could not signiﬁcantly affect the results.
All experimental conditions were run on a Macintosh com-
puter using VSearch software (Enns et al., 1990). Observers were
instructed to maintain ﬁxation during each trial, to detect the
target as quickly as possible, and to keep error rates below
5%. Responses were given via one of two response keys. All
observers completed four sets of 60 trials in each condition. Per-
formance was measured in terms of reaction times (RTs) that were
averaged for each observer; these were then recast into search
speed (average target-present slope3) and baseline (estimated time
3Slopes for each observer were calculated by determining mean response time for
each set size, and calculating a least-squares ﬁt through these points. Analysis used
repeated-measures ANOVAs, and paired, two-tailed t-tests. Target-present slopes
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needed for a single item in the display). A trial timed out—
and was considered an incorrect response—if more than 5 s was
needed.
EXPERIMENT 1
This experiment examined whether iconic memory can support
visual search for a simple feature. The target was a black vertical
line 0.8◦ long; distractors (non-targets) were similar lines ori-
ented ± 30◦ to the vertical (Figure 1A). Observers were asked to
detect the presence or absence of the target.
Condition 1A examined detection for the three cadences of
80/120, 200/120, and 80/240. Search of this kind typically has
target-present slopes of 15–30 ms/item in a static display (cf.
Treisman and Gormican, 1988). Search here was similar: RTs
showed a strong effect of set size [F(2,10) = 22.8; p < 0.0001],
with an average slope of 23.2 ms/item (Figure 1B). However,
no signiﬁcant effect of cadence was found [F(2,10) = 0.711;
p > 0.5], nor any signiﬁcant interaction between set size and
cadence [F(4,10) = 1.29; p > 0.3]. Cadence had no sig-
niﬁcant effect on either slopes [F(2,10) = 0.151; p > 0.8;
Figure 1C], or baselines [F(2,10) = 0.47; p > 0.6; Figure 1D].
Error rates were much the same for all cadences, indicat-
ing that no speed-accuracy trade-offs occurred. As such, these
results indicate that the information in iconic memory can
survive without serious degradation for at least 240 ms, consis-
tent with conclusions obtained elsewhere (e.g., Sperling, 1960;
Graziano and Sigman, 2008). And the lack of effect of dif-
ferent cadences—essentially, different switching rates—indicates
little cost of switching between visual and iconic representa-
tions.
As a test of whether the memory being used actually is iconic
memory, Condition 1B compared performance for the 80/240
cadence against two others: a 80/0 cadence (i.e., a display that
remained on), and a 80/320 cadence (in which the blank interval
was 320 ms). Paired t-tests showed that slopes and baselines for
80/240 and 80/0 conditions were virtually identical (p > 0.9 and
p> 0.5, respectively), both with a slope of 20.5 ms, indicating that
the ﬂicker had little effect. Extending the blank duration to 320 ms
showed a similar lack of effect (p > 0.2 and p > 0.9, respectively).
However, slopes for the 80/240 and 80/320 conditions were 20.5
and 25.2 ms/item respectively, suggesting a slight degradation for
the longer blank; indeed, a more detailed analysis4 indicates that
were used; target-absent slopes either followed the same pattern or showed no
strong effects. Error rates in the target-absent condition were generally low (below
2%) and did not vary much over different conditions. Errors for target-present
conditions either followed the pattern of the slopes or showed no strong effects,
indicating that speed-accuracy trade-off was not a factor.
4Usable memory duration u can be calculated in the following way. The total usable
time in each alteration is taken to be the duration of the visible component plus
the usable duration of the iconic component. Assuming the usable duration in the
80/120 and 200/120 cadences is 120ms ormore, and that speed is the same for visible
and iconic inputs (both assumptions supported by the results of Experiment 1),
search speed can be estimated by averaging the slopes of the two short-ISI cadences
to get slope sV, corresponding to search through a visible representation. The usable
fraction f over a complete display cycle is sV/sL, where sL is the slope of the long-ISI
cadence. For a long-ISI condition with on-time of 80 ms and display cycle ( = on-
time + off-time) of D ms, f is also (80+u)/D; rewriting, u = Df – 80 = D(sV/sL) –
80. The standard error of the mean of u can be determined from this formula, via
the standard errors of the slopes.
performance is a function of on-time plus a usable duration (u) of
246 ± 57 ms.
Taken together, these results are consistent with other ﬁnd-
ings showing that the information in iconic memory can survive
without serious degradation for several 100 ms (e.g., Sperling,
1960; Graziano and Sigman, 2008). The speed of search was
much the same throughout, not only supporting the proposal
that attentional selection and iconic memory involve common
representations (Ruff et al., 2007), but indicating that the iconic
representation can be used as easily and effectively as the one used
in “regular” vision, with the switch between visible and iconic
representations requiring little or no time.
EXPERIMENT 2
To examine the extent to which iconic memory can be used for
other tasks, Experiment 2 examined its involvement in change
detection. Based on the difﬁculty of detecting change in the
absence of attention (i.e., change blindness), it has been pro-
posed that most unattended structure is detailed but volatile,
with iconic memory being the quickly dissipating remnant of
this representation after the stimulus disappears (Rensink et al.,
1997; Rensink, 2000a). Subsequent work (Becker et al., 2000)
supported this proposal, indicating that the cueing of iconic
memory can guide attention, and thereby facilitate change
detection.
Experiment 2 used the same set sizes and much the same items
as in Experiment 1A. The same cadences were also used, so that
any interference from the ﬂickering displays would be about the
same. However, each display now contained approximately equal
numbers of vertical lines and lines tilted counterclockwise by 30◦.
The target was now the item that changed its orientation by 30◦
between displays (Figure 2A).
As before, set size had a strong effect on RT [F(2,11) = 172.1;
p < 0.0001; Figure 2B]. But there was now a signiﬁcant
effect of cadence [F(2,11) = 27.4; p < 0.0001] and a signiﬁ-
cant interaction between set size and cadence [F(4,11) = 24.5;
p < 0.0001]. In particular, cadence had a strong effect on
slopes [F(2,11) = 33.0; p < 0.0001; Figure 2C], which were
higher with increased off-time (p < 0.001). However, there
was no effect with increased on-time (p > 0.2), again indi-
cating that the different rates of switching between visual and
iconic representations had little effect. Baselines (Figure 2D)
were not reliably affected [F(2,11) = 1.31; p > 0.2). (In
general, baselines were never reliably different in all the con-
ditions that follow, and so are omitted from subsequent
analyses.)
Interpreting slopes in terms of the number of items held across
the blank interval (Rensink, 2000b), a strong effect of cadence
was again evident [F(2,11) = 20.1; p < 0.0001]. However, the
opposite pattern now occurred: hold did not differ signiﬁcantly
with greater off-time (p > 0.05), but increased with greater on-
time (p < 0.005). This is consistent with the proposal that under
these conditions the speed of change detection is largely governed
by the loading of information into visual short-term memory
(vSTM) and its subsequent comparison (Rensink, 2000b). It also
suggests that these operations take place largely during on-times
alone, being largely unable to use iconic memory. Indeed, a more
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FIGURE 2 | Experiment 2: detection of orientation change. (A) Stimuli
used. ∼50% of lines in each display are vertical, and 50% are tilted by 30◦
counterclockwise. Target is the item that changes between vertical and tilted;
distractors are those items that maintain a constant orientation. (B) Response
times and error rates as a function of set size for the three cadences. (C) Data
recast as slopes. Slope for base cadence (47.3 ms/item) is strongly affected
by an increase in off-time (83.0 ms/item) but not by an increase in on-time
(53.7 ms/item). (D) Data recast as baselines. Values for the 80/240 and
200/120 cadences have been subtracted by 120 ms to equate the time of ﬁrst
appearance of the changed item. Baseline for base cadence (645 ms) is not
signiﬁcantly affected by an increase in off-time (615 ms) or on-time (641 ms).
Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
detailed analysis of the slopes shows that performance is a func-
tion of on-time plus a usable duration of u = 115 ± 18 ms.
[Note that if usable duration started from stimulus onset, the sim-
ilar speeds for the 80/120 and 200/120 cadences would require a
value of at least 320 ms. But then there would be similar speeds
for the 80/240 and 200/120 cadences, which was not the case
(p< 0.0001). Thus, usable duration apparently begins at stimulus
offset.]
For the detection of both orientation and contrast changes, the
loading of information into vSTM is proportional to the dura-
tion of the display plus ∼110 ms (Rensink, 2000b, Figure 6).
Since the ISI in those conditions was 120 ms, this indicates
that usable duration u is not the “worth” of iconic mem-
ory (Loftus et al., 1992), but an actual time limit. Once this
limit is exceeded, iconic memory simply cannot be used for
change detection, even though the results of Experiment 1
indicate that it still exists, and contains potentially usable
information.
EXPERIMENT 3
To explore the generality of the limited usability found in
Experiment 2, Experiment 3 investigated other kinds of items
and kinds of change (Figure 3). Conditions were otherwise
much the same. In Condition 3A, items were rectangular
outlines 0.4◦ × 1.2◦, with targets changing orientation 90◦
between vertical and horizontal (Figure 3A). As in Experi-
ment 2, slopes depended strongly on cadence [F(2,11) = 14.4;
p < 0.0001], with search slowing reliably for increased off-
time (p < 0.001) but not increased on-time (p > 0.05).
Usable duration u was 117 ± 27 ms, much the same as
before.
Condition 3B examined change in location. Here, the target
jumped back and forth 1.2◦ each alternation, with distrac-
tors remaining stationary. Slopes again depended on cadence
[F(2,10) = 12.7; p < 0.0002], with search slowing for increased
off-time (p< 0.0002) but not increased on-time (p> 0.3). Usable
duration u was 123 ± 34 ms, similar to previous values.
Condition 3C looked at shape change, with the target alternat-
ing between a circle and a square. Although more difﬁcult than
the other conditions, similar results were found: slope depended
on cadence [F(2,11) = 9.9; p < 0.001], with search slowing for
increased off-time (p< 0.01) but not increased on-time (p> 0.9).
Usable durationuwas 139± 37ms, comparable to previous values.
Finally, condition 3D examined changes in contrast polar-
ity (black vs. white). Slopes again depended on cadence
[F(2,11) = 8.8; p < 0.002]. Search slowed down with increased
off-time (p < 0.05), and tended to speed up with increased on-
time, although statistical reliability was marginal (p = 0.06). [This
latter effect has been found elsewhere, where it was taken to
indicate a grouping process—based on polarity—that takes place
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FIGURE 3 | Experiment 3: detection of different kinds of feature
change. (A) Changing orientation. Slope for base cadence (38.7 ms/item)
is strongly affected by an increase in off-time (69.7 ms/item) but not an
increase in on-time (47.0 ms/item). (B) Changing location. Slope for
base cadence (33.1 ms/item) is strongly affected by an increase in
off-time (56.1 ms/item) but not an increase in on-time (38.0 ms/item).
(C) Changing shape. Slope for base cadence (69.4 ms/item) is strongly
affected by an increase in off-time (101.9 ms/item) but not an increase in
on-time (70.2 ms/item). (D) Changing polarity. Slope for the base cadence
(43.2 ms/item) is signiﬁcantly affected by an increase in off-time
(55.7 ms/item), but marginally affected by an increase in on-time
(37.6 ms/item). Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
over several 100 ms (Rensink, 2000b).] Comparing the 80/240
and 200/120 cadences (which equates time per alternation) shows
search to be reliably faster with greater on-time (p < 0.005); rela-
tive speeds yield u = 137 ± 34 ms, similar to the values for other
kinds of change. In summary, then, all change detection tasks
appeared to show the same kind of behavior, with the same usable
duration of about 120 ms.
EXPERIMENT 4
Experiment 4 investigated why the usability of iconic memory
might be limited for some tasks but not others. To determine if task
difﬁculty was important, Condition 4A gave observers a simple
detection task (as in Experiment 1), with the target deﬁned by a
horizontal bar only slightly higher than those of the distractors.
Speeds were now comparable to several of those in Experiments
2 and 3 (Figure 4A). However, cadence did not have much of an
effect [F(2,11) = 0.28; p > 0.7], indicating that difﬁculty per se
was not the critical factor.
To determine if usable duration might be different if a report
is required of the target, Condition 4B used much the same items
as in Condition 4A, but with half being black and half white;
observers were asked to identify the contrast of the target rather
than detect it (Figure 4B). Dependence on cadence now reap-
peared [F(2,11) = 4.0; p< 0.05], with search slowing for increased
off-time (p < 0.01) but not increased on-time (p > 0.3). Usable
duration u was 202 ± 29 ms, less than the 240 ms (or higher) limit
of a static detection task, but greater than the values for a change
detection task.
To determine if this value might have somehow been due to
the mixed polarity of the items, Condition 4C tested report of the
orientationof aT-shaped target (left or right) amongL-shapeddis-
tractors; all items were black (Figure 4C). Search again depended
on cadence [F(2,11) = 10.3; p < 0.001], slowing for increased
off-time (p < 0.002) but not increased on-time (p > 0.5). Usable
duration u was 181 ± 26 ms, similar to that for Condition 4B.
Finally, to examine whether the key factor in Conditions
4B and 4C might have been the existence of multiple kinds
of target, Condition 4D asked observers to detect (but not
report on) a T-shaped target among L-shaped distractors, with
all items—targets as well as distractors—in any of four ori-
entations (Figure 4D). Dependence on cadence now vanished
[F(2,11) = 0.49; p > 0.6], indicating that multiplicity was not
important.
Taken together, then, the results above suggest that the criti-
cal factor determining the extent to which iconic memory can be
used is not the difﬁculty of the task or the kinds of items involved,
but something about the task itself. A common element of change
detection and report—but not static detection—is the need for
an item to be individuated, i.e., treated as a particular individual
at a particular location (Smith, 1998; Pylyshyn, 2003). In change
detection, for example, an item that is initially seen (and stored in
vSTM) must be re-identiﬁed as the same item in the subsequent
presentation. Likewise in report, an item detected on the basis of
some given feature must be identiﬁed as such by whatever pro-
cess underlies the subsequent report. Such individuated items are
believed to play a key role inmany visual processes (Ullman, 1984).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results above indicate that for all visual search tasks, iconic
memory can act as a surrogate for about 120 ms: during this time
it can be used as easily and effectively as if the original stimulus
were present. Results also show that for some—but not all—tasks,
it is available for much longer. The key factor is not the difﬁculty
of the task or the type of feature involved; instead, it appears to be
the extent to which the task relies on individuation. Three groups
of limits were encountered: for change detection, ∼120 ms; for
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FIGURE 4 | Experiment 4: different tasks. (A) Detection of offset
horizontal line. Slope for base cadence (45.6 ms/item) is unaffected by an
increase in off-time (47.6 ms/item) or on-time (44.7 ms/item). (B) Report
of contrast polarity of offset horizontal line. Slope for base cadence
(66.6 ms/item) is reliably affected by an increase in off-time
(78.0 ms/item) but not an increase in on-time (71.1 ms/item). (C) Report
of orientation of T-shaped item. Slope for base cadence (40.8 ms/item) is
affected by an increase in off-time (50.7 ms/item) but not an increase in
on-time (42.0 ms/item). (D) Detection of T-shaped item. Slope for base
cadence (30.0 ms/item) is unaffected by an increase in off-time
(30.5 ms/item) or on-time (28.2 ms/item). Error bars indicate standard
error of the mean.
report, 190 ms; for static detection, at least 240 ms. The existence
of these groups suggests that iconic memory is not a monolithic
structure, but involves several (spatially organized) layers, drawn
upon by different tasks to different extents.
Traditionally, iconic memory is taken as having two com-
ponents: the ﬁrst a high-density, retinotopic visible persistence
existing up to 200 ms from stimulus onset (exact value depend-
ing on lighting level), and the second a longer-lasting infor-
mational persistence that is more abstract and mediated more
centrally (Coltheart, 1980; Loftus and Irwin, 1998). Since visi-
ble persistence can last on the order of a 100 ms under some
conditions (Coltheart, 1980), it may be part of the fastest-
decaying layer. However, access to the other layers lasts much
longer; as such, they would likely involve only informational
persistence.
Whatmight these layers correspond to? One possibility involves
re-entrant connections from higher level visual areas to lower
level ones. Complex static patterns can be detected by neurons
in areas such as temporal cortex; cells here have a considerable
degree of spatial invariance, responding to much of the visual
ﬁeld (e.g., Felleman and Van Essen, 1991). But to individuate an
item—to see it as a particular individual at a particular location—
requires linking these spatially invariant representations to lower
level retinotopic ones. This can be done, for example, by corre-
lating downward, spatially diffuse signals from higher levels with
upward, spatially precise ones from striate cortex (Di Lollo et al.,
2000; Tsotsos, 2011).
Results from several lines of research are consistent with
this general view. Massive numbers of re-entrant connections
exist between the cortical areas involved in visual perception
(e.g., Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Bullier, 2004). Such
connections can explain phenomena such as common-onset
masking (Di Lollo et al., 2000) and context effects in recognition
(Weisstein and Harris, 1974); indeed, they are believed to be
involved in a large variety of visual processes (Fukushima et al.,
1991; Tsotsos, 2011). As such, the representation of an item—a
visual object—is distributed over several levels, with its represen-
tation at these levels “knit” together by feedforward and feedback
circuits (e.g., Rensink, 2000a, 2002).
Looked at in this way, the different layers of iconic memory
could correspond to the memory traces at these different levels
(cf. Keysers et al., 2005; Ruff et al., 2007). After a stimulus dis-
appears, representations at the various levels—or at least, their
connections—begin to decay, with different time constants at each
level. Given that durations are generally longer at higher visual
areas (Keysers et al., 2005), the more detailed representations at
lower levels would likely be the ﬁrst to go. If so, the layer accessible
for only 120 ms would likely correspond to the lower level rep-
resentations. (Visible persistence may be part of this.) Given that
this layer is needed for change detection, it would likely contain
relatively precise spatial information, needed to ensure continu-
ity of representation over time (Rensink, 2000a, 2013). Meanwhile,
layers that are usable for longer durationsmight reﬂect higher level
representations, which are more abstract and have poorer spatial
localization.
Such as multi-layer theory of iconic memory could explain the
usable durations for the different kinds of task as follows:
(a) Static detection (≥240 ms). Information carried by the feedfor-
ward“wave” created by the appearance of an item reaches high
levels relatively quickly. After a brief time (c. 100 ms), access
to high-precision spatial information in the low iconic layers
begins to degrade. But since detection does not require precise
spatial information, it can still be “driven” by the information
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at the higher layers of iconicmemory for several 100ms longer.
This can explain many classic partial report results, which
require only a report of a stimulus (generally, a letter) at some
coarsely speciﬁed location, but not its precise position. Note
that although absolute position is eventually lost at higher lev-
els, precise relative positions could still be maintained. For
example, the targets in Condition 4A differed from the dis-
tractors by only a small shift in the position of a horizontal
bar; this information remained available for at least 240 ms.
Consistent with this, partial report studies suggest that shape
information in iconic memory can remain fairly accurate for
over 300 ms (Gegenfurtner and Sperling, 1993; Graziano and
Sigman, 2008).
(b) Change detection (c. 120 ms). The relatively short usable dura-
tion (120 ms) for change detection could reﬂect the need for
precise spatial location, which is required for item continu-
ity (Rensink, 2000a, 2013). An important issue is whether
this duration reﬂects the decay of the contents of the low-
level representation, or just the connections to it. Studies based
on exogenous cues indicate that positional information does
not degrade greatly for at least 300 ms (Graziano and Sig-
man, 2008). And since exogenous cues can make use of—and
transmit—the location of these cues, it would appear that feed-
forward connections can be maintained, at least for spatial
information of moderate resolution. In contrast, the process
of establishing a feedback connection to lower levels needs spa-
tial information that is very precise (Di Lollo et al., 2000); such
connections might therefore fail relatively quickly.
(c) Report (c. 190 ms). For the report tasks of Conditions 4B and
4C, usable duration is greater than that for change detection
but less than that for static detection. At least two explana-
tions are possible. First, it may be that detection proceeds as
usual, but a subsequent individuation stage is needed to report
the associated properties of the detected item; usable dura-
tion would then reﬂect the relative amount of time needed for
each of these stages. Consistent with this, slopes of the report
tasks were 10–20 ms/item greater than those of their detection
equivalents (Figure 4), suggesting the involvement of an addi-
tional processing stage. Alternatively, individuation may only
need to be partial—i.e., the representation of the target item
need only be linked back to a level where its location can be
readily distinguished from those of the others. If so, feedback
connections may only be established with a mid-level layer,
which may endure somewhat longer than those at lower levels.
Relation to other work
Among other things, the proposal here is consistent with results on
attentional capture and apparent motion that show a visual con-
tinuity for 100 ms after the disappearance of an item (e.g., Yantis
and Gibson, 1994). It is also consistent with ﬁndings of partial
report experiments that (i) when a mask is shown after stimu-
lus disappearance, identiﬁcation errors arise only if the mask is
shown within 150 ms or so of stimulus onset, while localization
errors can be induced even if the mask is presented much later,
and (ii) if a mask is not used, localization errors begin soon after
stimulus disappearance, while identiﬁcation errors remain low
(Mewhort et al., 1981). These patterns can be explained by the
existence of a durable array (or “buffer”) of fairly complex but
poorly localized information at higher levels, along with a rela-
tively fast decay of their connections to spatial locations at lower
ones.
The proposal of multiple layers of iconic memory is also sim-
ilar in some ways to the proposal of multiple systems of visual
memory (e.g., Sligte et al., 2010). There is general agreement with
the idea of detailed, volatile representations at the lower levels,
along with a single detailed, longer-lasting representation (corre-
sponding to a visual object) held in vSTM (cf. Rensink, 2000a,
2002). Multiple-systems experiments are based on the use of posi-
tional cues with delays of several seconds. Since this is beyond
the lifetime of “classic” iconic memory, they are likely concerned
with longer-lasting—and likely more limited—representations.
The exact nature of this memory is not completely understood;
indeed, the existence of a distinct “fragile” vSTM is still contro-
versial (see e.g., Makovski, 2012). But if multiple systems do exist,
they could be higher level counterparts of the layers proposed
here.
Iconic memory, feedback connections, and visual attention
The theory of iconic memory described here also has implications
for the role of feedback processes in human vision. Anatomi-
cal and physiological studies indicate that human vision relies
upon two main types of feedback connections (e.g., Bullier,
2004). The ﬁrst are horizontal connections of adjacent cells at
the same level of the processing stream; these converge quickly
and can potentially support rapid local computation of consid-
erable complexity, such as determination of local shape. Given
the durability of high-accuracy (local) shape representation in
iconic memory (Mewhort et al., 1981), such connections appear
to be relatively long-lasting. Longer-range connections can also
exist between corresponding locations in representations at the
same level of the visual hierarchy (e.g., representations of color
and orientation). The second type of connection involves vertical
links between corresponding cells at different levels. As discussed
above, the memory at each of these levels—and in the connections
between them—may be the basis of the iconic layers proposed
here.
It has been proposed that“the representation of any item in this
form of storage [iconic memory] is achieved by creating a tempo-
rary ﬁle of information about the item” (Coltheart, 1983, p. 291),
with relatively complex structure (such as characters) created in
parallel across the visual ﬁeld, but susceptible to overwriting by
the subsequent appearance of other structures (Mewhort et al.,
1981; Coltheart, 1983). This is similar to the proposal of proto-
objects (Rensink and Enns, 1998), which are relatively complex
structures of limited extent formed rapidly and in parallel in the
(near-) absence of attention; these too are temporary, either fading
away within a few 100 ms, or being overwritten by the repre-
sentation of a new item that appears at their location (Rensink
et al., 1997). Fast-acting horizontal connections could explain
why the within-item binding needed for proto-objects can be
achieved using so little time and so little attention. They could
also explain why considerable binding exists in iconic memory
(Landman et al., 2003), even in its lowest layers (Experiments 1
and 4A).
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Meanwhile, vertical connections could be the basis of larger-
scale representations. Feedforward and feedback links likely
connect corresponding locations at different levels in a fairly
dense way (e.g., Di Lollo et al., 2000). Such links could enable
retinotopic representations at low-levels (e.g., in striate cortex) to
connect to spatiotopic representations at high ones (e.g., in tem-
poral cortex) via a series of stages in which position is increasingly
less tied to retinal location (e.g., Tsotsos, 2011). And attention
might act by establishing long-range feedforward-feedback loops
to represent a coherent visual object, resulting in a representa-
tion distributed across the various levels, their contents linked
via circuits connecting contents at the same (relative) spatial
location (Rensink, 2000a, 2002; Lamme, 2003; Sligte et al., 2010;
Tsotsos, 2011).
Characterizing “iconic,” “preattentive,” and “attentive” repre-
sentations in this way can account for why performance on iconic
and visible representations is so similar (Experiment 1), why selec-
tive attention and readout from iconic memory involve common
neural mechanisms (e.g., Ruff et al., 2007), and why there is little
cost for switching between the two (Experiments 1 and 4A). Said
simply, there is no separate “iconic” memory system: the layers of
iconic memory are just the traces of the representations through
which normal visual perception proceeds (see also Keysers et al.,
2005; Ruff et al., 2007).
In this view, iconic memory—or at least, informational
persistence—has a clear purpose: to help establish and main-
tain links between the various spatially organized representations
of an item. Given the decreasing precision of representations with
increasing level, processes based on a feedforward sweep of infor-
mation could continue to use such information even after the
contents at the lower levels have faded. However, processes relying
on feedback from higher levels would not always have access to the
more detailed (but volatile) representations at lower ones; when
this happens, the process must wait for the contents of these to be
re-instantiated.
The extent to which this proposal adequately captures the oper-
ation of the visual system is unclear. But to the degree that it
is relevant, the “usability logic” developed here could provide a
useful way to investigate the various feedforward and feedback
mechanisms involved.
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